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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF STATE
EXTRADITION LEGISLATION
Flexibility has long been an acclaimed virtue of the United States
Constitution. If such is the case, then the extradition clause is an excep-
tion." Framed in explicit language and couched in terms of state juris-
diction, this provision does not appear to permit federal legislation to
provide procedures for the return of criminals in situations not within
its precise scope. Accordingly, the states, in cooperation, have enacted
uniform measures to close this constitutional lacuna. The validity of
these measures is still in question, but it is manifest that the solution
hinges upon the existence of state power to legislate in this area; this,
in turn, depends upon an interpretation of the constitutional provision.
Undoubtedly the purpose of the extradition clause was to obligate
each state to return fugitives-the matter was not to be subject to the
states' sole discretion. But writings contemporary to the constitutional
convention shed no light as to who was to effectuate the directive, how
it was to operate, or when it would operate.2 Edmund Randolph, Attor-
ney General under President George Washington, instigated congres-
sional action by voicing the opinion that the constitutional provision was
not self-executing and that Congress was empowered to give it effect.3
Following this interpretation, Congress enacted a statute in 1793 the
terms of which are substantially operative today.4 Written in mandatory
language, it requires the governor of the state where the crime was cor-
1. U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2. "A person charged in any State with Treason,
Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State
shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."
2. ScoTT, U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1787 624 (1893). The convention
adopted the provision of the Articles of Confederation Art. IV relating to the rendi-
tion of fugitives except that "and high misdemeanor" under the Articles was changed
to "and other Crime" in the Constitution. Neither the Madison Papers nor The Fed-
eralist shed any enlightenment on this clause.
3. 2 MOORE, ExnRADITIoN 842-845 (1891).
4. REv. STAT. § 5278, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1951), formerly § 662. "Whenever the
executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from
justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person
has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a
magistrate of any State or Territory charging the person demanded with having com-
mitted treason, felony or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief
magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it
shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such
person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the
arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent
of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be
delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six months
from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged ... " See also, 2 Moomi,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 845.
NOTES
mitted to demand the fugitive's return by the executive authority of the
asylum state. In addition, the alleged fugitive must have been charged
with a crime in the demanding state and must have fled from justice.5
If the governor of the asylum state signs the rendition papers, the
alleged criminal may challenge the propriety of such action in the asylum
state's courts upon two grounds: first, he must prove that he was not
substantially charged with a crime under the demanding state's laws;
second, he must show that he was not a fugitive from justice from the
demanding state. It is of importance that this latter requirement has
been construed to mean that the person must have been physically present
in the demanding state when the crime was committed and must have
subsequently fled.'
The cases have, therefore, clearly interpreted the federal act and
the procedures to be followed in respect to it. Since the congressional
measure fails to provide a method for a fugitive's arrest and return, much
state legislation has been directed to this end ;7 and it has been held consti-
tutional." Other enactments intended to supplement the federal provision,
however, present debatable constitutional questions thus far unanswered.
Included in this category are the Uniform Extradition Act, Section 6,
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Section 5, and
the Uniform Out-of-State Parolee Compact, Section 1.9 All of these
acts go beyond the constitutional provision in the sense that they provide
for rendition in situations not contemplated therein.
5. In Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1860), the Supreme Court upheld
the power of Congress to legislate regarding extradition. The Court further held that
the Constitution as well as the act of Congress contemplated a demand on the execu-
tive authority of the asylum state for the return of fugitives but that the governor
was under only a moral obligation to comply with such proper demand, and the courts
could not mandate the governor to extradite.
6. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of N.Y., 245 U.S. 128 (1917); Roberts
v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885).
7. UNIFORM EXTRADITION ACT §§ 12-28 (1936), establish the procedures of arrest
and return which shall govern in extradition of criminals. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov-
ERNMENTs, THE HANDBOOK ON INTEmSTATE CRIMEra CONTROL 8-30 (1949).
8. Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127 (1915). The petitioner had been extradited from
Oregon to Texas to stand trial for a crime. Upon acquittal, Georgia demanded the
return of the petitioner for trial on another crime. Petitioner argued that since she
was involuntarily taken into Texas and had not fled to that state she was not subject
to rendition to Georgia. Since petitioner did not allege that she- had never been in
Georgia the Supreme Court assumed this fact to be true, and found that allowing
the return to the demanding state of a fugitive who is involuntarily brought into the
asylum state was valid. The failure of the federal government to provide for this
situation left it in the hands of state authority.
9. See discussions by COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op.clt, szopra note 7.
For background facts concerning the Uniform Extradition Act and the Parolee
Compact see Note, 31 MINN. L. REv. 699 (1947).
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For example, when a crime is committed in the demanding state
by a person not present in the state, neither the constitutional provision
nor federal legislation enacted pursuant to it furnish a means of extra-
dition. The phrase "to flee from justice and be found in another state" 10
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that the alleged
criminal must have been in the demanding state at the time the crime was
committed and subsequently fled." Thus, a person standing in state X and
shooting B in state Y could not be extradited under congressional
authority; the accessory in state A to a crime committed in state B is
similarly shielded from justice; the runaway father who fails to support
his family would also be immune from criminal prosecution in the
demanding state. Therefore, geographical location, obviously irrelevant
in determining whether a crime has been committed, would prevent
extradition under applicable federal legislation. It was to bridge this
gap in the Constitution and the congressional act that the Uniform Crim-
inal Extradition Act, Section 6, and the Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act, Section 5 were passed. 12 Manifestly, the Constitu-
tion was not intended to serve as a shield to criminals; consequently an
interpretation of the extradition clause which supports the validity of
these uniform acts would rest upon firm foundation.'3
The Parolee Compact, 14 approved by all of the states, was adopted
10. U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2.
11. Hogan v. O'Neill, 225 U.S. 52 (1920); Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Cockran,
188 U.S. 691 (1902) ; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885).
12. Thirty-five states have adopted the Uniform Extradition Act. E.g., CAl_
PEN. CODE §§ 1548-1556.2 (1949) ; FLA. STAT. §§ 941.01-941.29 (1951) ; IND. ANN. STAT.§§ 9-403--9-417 (Burns 1942) ; IowA CODE ANN. c. 759, § 1 et seq. (1951) ; N. Y. CODE
CRim. PRoc. §829; TFx. CODE CRIm. PRoc. ANN. art. 1008a, (Supp. 1952). See THE
CouxciL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 137 (1952-53), for an
up-to-date list of the states which have adopted this legislation.
Thirty-nine states have adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-3102 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1951); Ky. REv. STAT.
§§407-010 et seq. (Legis. Supp. 1950); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 8007-1 et 4eq. (1951).
See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, RECIPROCAL STATE LEaGISTION TO ENFORCE
THE SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS (1951), for other states which have adopted this legis-
lation.
13. Doubt is expressed as to the constitutionality of the UNIFoRM ExT rnox
ACT § 6 in Green, Duties of the Asylum State Under the Uniform Criminal Extradi-
tion Act, 30 J. Ciam. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 323 (1939-40).
14. States are prohibited from entering into compacts without the consent of
Congress by U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 10. Compacts are actually contracts between the
states by which boundary disputes may be settled, or through which the cost of a
bridge between the states may be-shared. Usually states enter into their compacts
and then look to Congress for its approval; however, in 1934 Congress passed a
statute giving its advance consent to two or more states to enter into compacts to
aid in the mutual enforcement of their criminal laws. 4 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. 1952),
formerly 18 U.S.C. § 420. Under this authority from the federal government all states
have entered the Parolee Compact. The method used by the states in adopting this
compact was through passage of an enabling act by the various legislatures allowing
664
NOTES
to solve a somewhat different problem than that dealt with by the Uni-
form Extradition Act.' 5 Often parole officials found it desirable to permit
a parolee to serve the terms of his parole in a foreign state. Since no
methods were available to supervise the parolee, it was necessary to
utilize extradition procedure to achieve return of 'a man who had been
only conditionally released from incarceration for the commission of a
crime. Following this procedure enabled the parolee to challenge his
return in a habeas corpus action on the technical grounds that, since he
was permitted to leave the demanding state, he was not a fugitive from
justice within the meaning of the federal statute.:6 If the state relied
upon the Uniform Extradition Act, the parolee based his opposition to
return upon the constitutional invalidity of that Act.17 Although these
arguments have been ineffective in state courts,' the litigious nature of
the extradition procedure rendered this machinery unwieldly and unde-
sirable. As a practical matter these defenses may be anticipated by
restricting the parolee to the demanding state as a term of parole. If a
parolee breaches this term, he then has no standing to question extradi-
tion.'9 The undesirability of this method of return is evident, however,
upon even a slight consideration of the influences which make out-of-
state parole desirable for society.
To alleviate this situation, the Parolee Compact provides for super-
vision of an out-of-state parolee by officials of the foreign state and also
stipulates that upon breach of parole the officers of the paroling state
may return the violator without resort to extradition proceedings.
20
Thus, the Extradition Act, Section 6, permits rendition in circumstances
not sufficient to invoke extradition under the federal enactment, while
the Parolee Compact avoids its restrictive provisions by the simple
expedient of ignoring established extradition procedures. Nevertheless,
similar influential policy considerations support an interpretation of the
the governors of the states to compact with all the United States on the terms set
down in the enactment. See the discussion by THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 46-84.
15. E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 153, §§44(7)-44(25) (1935); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-3001 (Burns Supp. 1951); MICH. Comp. LAws § 7801. et seq (1948); MINN. STAT.
§ 637.16 (1947). For an up-to-date list of states which have adopted this compact, see
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 23.
16. Ex parte Kabrich, 343 Mo. 196, 120 S.W2d 42 (1942).
17. Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 334, 44 N.E.2d 807 (1942).
18. In Ex parte Garvey, 133 Tex. Cr. 500, 112 S.W.2d 747 (1938), the court held
that an out-of-state parolee was subject to extradition as a fugitive from justice.
19. Reed v. Colpoys, 69 App. D.C. 163, 99 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Ross v.
Becher, 382 IIl. 404, 47 N.E.2d 475 (1943) ; Ex parte Summers, 40 Wash. 2d 419, 243 P.2d
494 (1953).
20. UNIFORM PAROLEE COMPACT, IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3001 (Burns Supp. 1951).
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United States Constitution which would validate the Compact. Particu-
larly persuasive is the flexibility thus imparted to the parole system,
thereby permitting the parolee to be readjusted to society in an environ-
ment most conducive to that end. 21 Geographic location arbitrarily fixed
by state boundary lines should not be permitted to encase the parole
system in a straitjacket. To the extent that regular extradition proceed-
ings would have this effect, the Parolee Compact attains added desir-
ability.
Despite the obvious advantages of these state enactments, a hold-
ing that Congress has the exclusive power to legislate regarding extradi-
tion is possible. In fact early writers upon the subject assumed that this
was true.2 2 Although the Supreme Court, in Innes v. Tobin, upheld
extradition of a person who was involuntarily moved to the asylum
state, stating that federal legislation was not exclusive, other language
in the case indicates that the Court felt the states may legislate only
within the limits of the constitutional provision.23 Circumscribing state
legislative power to those fact situations in which the person com-
mitted the crime while in the demanding state would render Section 6
of the Uniform Extradition Act unconstitutional. Similarly, the con-
stitutionality of the Parolee Compact would be open to serious ques-
tion. The Constitution, as int&preted, requires a demand upon the gov-
ernor of the asylum state by the executive authority of the demanding
state. 2 4 The complete absence of extradition procedures in the machinery
of the Parolee Compact obviously does not accord with the constitu-
tional provision.
Since the language of Innes v. Tobin is dicta, however, its im-
port should not be exaggerated. 25 Moreover, the context of the Court's
decision did not include state legislation which had been uniformly
adopted to meet everyday actualities in the administration of criminal
justice. The presence of such legislation, supported as it is by sound
21. Other factors which would seem to support the constitutionality of the Parolee
Compact are: first, convicted criminals subject to confinement are being dealt with;
second, as terms of their parole to another state the parolee consents to return without
extradition; and third, if normal extradition proceedings were followed and the parolee
sought review on habeas corpus there are no important questions which he might raise,
for whether or not there is a parol violation is determined by the laws of the paroling
state. People v. Ruthazer, 98 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 N.E.2d 458 (1952).
22. 2 MooRE, op.cit. supra note 3, at 863-64. The language in early cases also
indicates this view. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1860); Prigg v. Com-
monwealth, 16 Pet. 539 (U.S. 1842).
23. Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127 (1915). See note 8 supra.
24. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1860).
25. 240 U.S. 127 (1915). The Supreme Court in this case did not precisely decide
the question of whether state legislation may go beyond the limits of the Constitution.
NOTES
social policy, increases the probability that the constitutional provision
will not be construed so as to frustrate cooperative efforts by the states
to meet a problem which possibly could not be constitutionally solved
by federal action.
At least two possible interpretations of the constitutional provi-
sion could be utilized to sustain the state legislation and compacts-one
is analogous to the approach to the affirmative powers of Congress as
exemplified by the commerce clause, the other merely advances the thesis
that the states are free to provide rendition in situations other than the
one provided for and contemplated by the Constitution. Although the
practical effect of the two propositions is substantially the same, the
gauge by which state techniques would be measured upon judicial review
materially differs.
Following the commerce clause type of approach the rendition clause
of the Constitution would be treated as an affirmative power of Con-
gress, the latter body having exclusive power to act within the limits
delineated by the Constitution. Then, state legislation would be permis-
sible insofar as federal action was not intended to be exclusive and if
state enactments did not interfere with federal policy. Beyond the bounds
of the power conferred upon Congress, state legislation would be
proper. 26 Consequently, it could be argued that since the Constitution
does not provide for the rendition of persons not in the state when the
crime was committed, for Congress to legislate regarding this matter
would violate its constitutional grant of power. Hence, a state's legis-
lation with respect to this situation would be a valid exercise of its
reserved power. Likewise, the proposition would seem valid that a
parolee who is allowed to serve his parole in a foreign state is not a
fugitive from justice within the meaning of the Constitution and thus-,
the power to regulate the means of return does not fall within the power
cf Congress but may properly be exercised by the states.
Though this view would sustain the constitutionality of the state
enactments, sound objections may be offered against it. As a technical
matter it should be noted that the extradition clause is not included as
part of the affirmative powers granted to Congress. 27 Of more impor-
tance, however, is the realization that the extent of review implied by
imputing some kind of negative implication to the extradition clause
26. This commerce clause approach is demonstrated in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
27. The affirmative powers of Congress are set forth in U.S. CoNsT. Art. 1,
§ 8, while the extradition clause is in Art. 4, § 2.
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is highly inconsistent with the relative state and national interests con-
cerned. Since the infractions concerned are committed against state
kaw and since the state is the authority seeking return, the sole national
interest would seem to extend no further than provision for a uniform
method of rendition in order to effectuate the executory extradition
clause. The absence of strong national concern is further emphasized
by the fact that, despite an apparent need for revision, the federal extra-
dition statute has been unchanged in substance since its original passage
in 1793.28 In addition, the commerce clause analogy has little basis
in fact since the clause deals with a subject matter of such national con-
cern that even in the absence of federal legislation, state enactments
which affect interstate commerce may sometimes be invalidated. 29 Thus,
in establishing the meaning of the commerce clause, the Supreme Court
has played a major role in determining the extent of federal power and
of permissible encroachment by state law. Such review by the Supreme
Court seems unwarranted with reference to interstate rendition where
the state concern is so strong and the national interest so minimal.
For this reason, therefore, merit exists in an alternative inter-
pretation of the extradition clause. Adopted by several state appellate
courts in upholding the propriety of the uniform state legislation, the
Constitution, in this view, empowers Congress to provide a procedure
for the return of fugitives. But the states, although always able to
utilize the means which Congress furnishes, are free in the exercise of
their own power to employ new methods of rendition for law violators
and new classes of persons who may be returned to a demanding state.30
Under this approach the Supreme Court would merely interpret federal
28. The original federal law was passed in 1793. For discussion see 2 MOORE,
op.cit. supra note 3, at 845-8.
29. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
30. In Ex parte Tenner, 20 Cal.2d 670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942), the California Su-
preme Court dealt with the constitutionality of the return of an out-of-state parolee
without following extradition proceedings. The court concluded that the Constitution
and federal statute provided an alternative method of return, but the states had power
to allow a return of a parolee without following these proceedings. The court also
injected into the opinion the fact that the parolee as terms of his parol had consented
to such a return. See also, Gulley v. Apple, 213 Ark. 350, 210 S.W.2d 514 (1948);
People v. Ruthazer, 98 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 N.E.2d 458 (1952) ; Pierce v. Smith, 31
Wash.2d 52, 195 P.2d 112 (1948). In Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 334, 44
N.E.2d 807 (1942), the court held that the Uniform Extradition Act § 6, allowing
rendition of a person not in the demanding state when the crime was committed, was
constitutional. This was said to be a valid exercise of the state's police power. See also,
Ex parte Morgan, 86 Cal. App.2d 217, 194 P.2d 800 (1948); McLarnan v. Hasson,
242 Iowa 1192, 48 N.W.2d 887 (1951); Ex parte Dalton, 56 N.M. 407, 244 P.2d 790
(1952).
For discussion of Ex parte Tenner see Note, 43 COL. L. REv. 379 (1943); see
91 U. of PA. L. Ray. 669 (1943) for comment on Culbertson v. Sweetwy.
NOTES
legislation, thus avoiding the necessity to define the limits of national
power, the extent to which it has been exercised, and the determination
as to whether state legislation conflicts. In other words, no limitation
upon state power would be implied from the extradition clause of the
Constitution.
Superficially, such an interpretation seems radical for it apparently
gives the states unrestricted authority to legislate in this field, including
the power to replace a well-established system of extradition. But no
grounds may be posited which support an implication that the states
would abuse this power; existing uniform state laws have been of mate-
rial benefit. Moreover, merely because the extradition clause places no
limitation on the states, it does not follow that the states have unfettered
power. The due process clause of the Constitution could feasibly be used
to check the use of questionable rendition legislation. Though no
Supreme Court decisions establish this function of due process, its
possible application has been recognized, at least, by state courts.31
Should state legislation result in grave injustice, the due process concept
could be utilized to prevent its operation, for it is well established that
state action not consonant with basic standards of justice is a denial
of due process of law.32 That some states might so act is not mere con-
jecture.
A. compact entered into by Kansas, New Mexico, Colorado, and
Wyoming 3 stipulates that the officers of any of these states in pursuit
of an alleged criminal may cross the borders of any other member state
to arrest and return him without resorting to extradition proceedings."
If the effect of this agreement is to legalize the removal of a supposed
31. People v. Ruthazer, 98 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 N.E.2d 458 (1952); Pierce v. Smith,
31 Wash.2d 52, 195 P.2d 112 (1948).
32. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143(1943).
33. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 153, §§44(1)-(5) (1935). Officers of member states
are allowed to arrest:
"(a) While in pursuit of any person who has committed a felony in said state; or
(b) While in pursuit of any person who had been charged with the commission
of a felony in said state; or(c) While in pursuit of any person who escaped from custody of any peni-
tentiary, jail. .. ."
Under these situations extradition is waived and officers of the compacting states
are authorized to make an arrest and removal of a person. See discussion by THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4-6.
34. The UNIFORM FRESH PURSUIT AcT § 2, allows arrest by officers, but requires
that a magistrate determine the lawfulness of the arrest, and that the alleged criminal
be held for extradition. See discussion by THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 1-7. Examples of the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Act may be found
in CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 852-852.4 (1949); IND. ANN. STAT. §§9-451-9-458 (Bums
Supp. 1951); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 756, § 1 (1951); MIcH. Comp. LAws §§ 780.101-
780.108 (1948).
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criminal without affording him an opportunity to secure a writ of habeas"
corpus to determine if the compact has been complied with, successful
objection might be made that due process has not been accorded:35 The
Supreme Court has held that one has no right to extradition proceed-
ings, hence if a person is illegally removed from a jurisdiction his sole
remedy is a civil action against the removing officers. No question con-
cerning the illegal return may be raised at the criminal trial in the de-
manding state's courts.3 6 It does not by necessity follow, that a state
has power to authorize the return of a person by local officers or by
officers of the demanding state without giving him an opportunity to
challenge the removal in court.
Law enforcement officers possess no authority to arrest except
upon a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and that the
suspect committed the crime. But when the officer of 'one state is em-
powered by the laws of another state to make arrests in the latter state.
while in pursuit, he has thus been permitted to determine whether he
is in pursuit within the statute's meaning and whether there are sub-
stantial grounds to support a valid return. Such wide discretion could
easily be abused, resulting in the arrest and return of the innocent as
well as the guilty.3s
Despite the fact that these four states may waive the requirement
of technical extradition procedures, it may be contended that due process
requires a hearing in the asylum state to determine whether the suspect
has been charged with a crime, or, at least, whether reasonable grounds
exist upon which a crime may be charged, before his return is legal.38
35. The compact makes no provision for a hearing. If the officers arrest and
return a man without giving him an opportunity to sue out a writ of habeas corpus
or go before a magistrate to determine if the terms of the statute of the asylum state
are complied with, the return may be questioned as illegal under due process subjecting
the officers to civil liability and existing criminal measures.
36. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 217 (1906).
37. In Austjford v. Guthner, 109 Colo. 47, 121 P.2d 891 (1942), the petitioner
was allowed to go into the courts of Colorado, and the Supreme Court of that state
found that he could not be returned under the compact, CoLo. STAr. ANN. c. 153,§§ 44(1)-(5) (1935), since the arresting officers were not in pursuit.
This case emphasizes the abuse which could result if the officers of a member
state could make a legal return without first giving the alleged criminal a hearing.
38. A state official transporting a person illegally into another state for trial is,
of course, subject to a civil action for false imprisonment and criminal action for
kidnapping. Now he would also be subject to prosecution under the Federal Kid-
napping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1950).
In Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951), it was held that if officials
violated the Kidnapping Act in transporting one for trial in another state, the injured
person could obtain relief against prosecution by securing a writ of habeas corpus in
a federal court. If sustained this case would in effect reverse Pettibone v. Nichols,
203 U.S. 217 (1906), supra note 34. For discussion, see Note, 27 IND. IJ. 292 '(1952)..
NOTES
Requiring the arresting officers to appear before a magistrate would
not impose an undue burden, but it would afford some protection against
unjustifiable rendition.
But stipulating that such a hearing is always necessary is unwar-
ranted. Under the Parolee Compact, for example, the parolee as a
condition of his release must agree to be returned without extradition
proceedings in the event of a breach. 39 Failure to require a hearing in
such a situation would hardly be a grave injustice since the only ques-
tion is whether he violated parole. This, of course, is decided by the
proper agency in the parolling state. The pursuit compact materially
differs in that no consent has been given nor is there an uncompleted
sentence to be served, i.e., the person has not been convicted of a crime.
Conclusion
The constitutional validity of state legislation relating to extra-
dition has not yet been decided by the United States Supreme Court.
Since the policy underlying these measures is to aid the process of
criminal justice by bringing alleged law violators to trial and by pro-
viding for the readjustment of past offenders to society, substantial
grounds exist for sustaining their validity. Furthermore, no realistic
considerations require Article 4, Section 2, to be so construed as to
foreclose the states from providing for rendition in circumstances ob-
viously not anticipated in the 18th century. Measuring state ena(!tments
against the traditional due process concept of justice and decency would
effectively correct any injustices which may result should the states
furnish other less rigid rendition procedures. In this fashion the extra-
dition clause of the Constitution would not stand as an obstacle to
realistic solution of problems which are national in origin, but not sub-
ject to Congressional treatment within the mandate of the Constitution.
39. Ex parte Tenner, 20 Cal.2d 670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942).

